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ABSTRACT 
This study aims to find out the effects of mediated and interpersonal communication 
on voters' decision-making during a presidential election campaign. Previous election studies 
ordinarily assumed that the effect of communication is homogeneous throughout the election 
cycle. Since election campaigns are time-bound, the effects of communication may not be the 
same across the election campaign. This study illuminates the role of communication on 
voters' decision-making using event history analysis. 
The results show that: (1) the effects of communication are regulated or moderated 
by time. The effect size was observed to grow as the election season draws to a close. (2) 
There is a difference in mediated and interpersonal communication effects at different stages 
of the election campaign. Before the national convention, greater mass media exposure was 
found to be related to faster change in decision status from undecided to decided. However, 
two weeks before election day, more interpersonal communication led to a faster change in 
voting decisions. (3) The level of campaign interest was found to regulate the effect of 
communication at each campaign stage. The effect of mass media exposure grew with 
increasing levels of campaign interest before the national convention while that of 
interpersonal communication became stronger as level of campaign interest declines two 
weeks before election day. 
The results imply that the usual assumptions of election studies should be re- 
considered to fully understand the impact of communication on voters' decision-making. 
Future studies should include the effects of time and different modes of communicating in 
their analytical models. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Sending and receiving information occupy a central position in informed political 
decision-making especially during elections. Citizens make political decisions based on what 
they saw, heard, or learned through interpersonal contacts, the mass media, and other 
information sources. Despite the enormous consequences of citizens' voting choices, how 
politics and the government work are still unfamiliar to many. What little they know about 
these topics are often gleaned from the mass media. 
Indeed, many depend on the media for political information, to construct political 
attitudes, and to eventually arrive at political decisions. Scholars generally agree that the 
advent of television and its spread to nearly every home have eroded traditional political 
influences such as political partisanship, family or peer groups, church and civic 
communities (Graber, 2002; Nie, verba & Petrocik, 1976; Putnam, 2000). These studies 
ushered ongoing debates about the quality and quantity of media effects on citizens' voting 
choices. They have also prompted political scientists, sociologists and communication 
scholars to study the effects of the media on the political process especially during election 
campaigns. 
Problems with previous studies 
Since the Columbia School embarked on voting studies using social survey 
techniques in the 1940s, many have investigated the relationship between the mass media and 
voting-related factors such as voters' information processing, attitudes, political judgment, 
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and voting behavior. These studies have generally arrived at the following conclusions: 
1. Although the media had been pivotal in providing political information about the political 
process and politicians, their effects on political judgments or attitude changes were minimal 
at best (e.g., Klapper, 1960). In many instances, the media seemed to have merely reinforced 
citizens' pre-existing attitudes and were unable to convert or change those attitudes. 
2. Voting behaviors were mainly explained by social-demographic factors (e.g., Lazarsfeld, 
Berelson & Gaudet, 1944) orpolitical-psychological factors such as party identification, 
issue or image evaluations (Campbell et al., 1960). In other words, media exposure and/or 
attention were not directly (or were minimally) related with voting behavior. 
3. The media's effects on voters during election campaigns were limited to knowledge 
acquisition (e.g., Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996) or candidate image formation (e.g., Markus, 
2003; Markus, Neuman & MacKuen, 2000). In other words, media exposure and/or attention 
were related to other variables closely tied to voting behavior but not directly to voting 
behavior itself. 
4. The media's impact on political decision-making was long-term, not short-term. That is, 
the media function to provide information about important issues in an election (e.g., 
McCombs &Shaw, 1972) and some important criteria with which to evaluate political events 
or politicians (e.g., Iyengar &Kinder, 1987; Iyengar, 1991). However, these effects were also 
indirect. 
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5. The media's portrayal of politics influences citizens' perceptions of politics and/or 
politicians. Negatively framed news accounts (e.g., Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995), horse-
race type of reporting, cynicism and other aspects of journalistic practice (e.g., Cappella & 
Jamieson, 1997) distort citizens' perception of the democratic political procedure, generate 
distrust in politics and/or politicians and aggravate non-voting or civic disengagement 
(Putnam, 2000). These effects, however, were found to be rooted on specific reporting 
practices, not on general media performance. 
Despite a plethora of election-related studies, the actual time or point when voting 
decisions were made, an important aspect of the election process, has been hardly 
investigated. Two assumptions concerning "time" and "voters" can be discerned from this 
limited number of studies. 
First, most of these studies assume that political campaigns are not time-bound. In a 
given period, voters were assumed to show very stable traits. Even after finding that late 
decision-makers did not have much interest in the election itself and were not politically 
active (e. g., Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet, 1.944), the nature of time and its importance in 
the political campaign process did not receive serious research attention (Gopoian & 
Hadj iharalambous, 1994). Additionally, these studies were mainly cross-sectional in design 
and were therefore unable to consider the modeling of relationship between voting behavior 
and time during political campaigns despite the fact that the approval rates of candidates 
fluctuate across time. A political neophyte like Bill Clinton, for example, can sometimes 
outrun an influential candidate. That approval rates change across time supports the 
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contention that election campaigns are elastic and that voters' decisions are time-dependent 
political actions. 
Second, late deciders are assumed to be falling within a homogeneous group 
(Gopoian &Hadjiharalambous, 1994) although classic election studies (e.g., Campbell, et al., 
1960; Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet, 1944) have shown that a small group of late decision-
makers was apathetic to politics and to elections in general. Despite the finding that late 
decision-makers can tilt election outcomes, they were basically ignored. Even though such 
voters have little or no political interest, their participatory possibilities varied according to 
contexts (Palma, 1970). For example, while some are generally alienated from politics 
(Seeman, 1959), there are those who intentionally hesitate to make decisions to select better 
candidates (Braybrooke, 1998). Without considering the characteristics of late decision-
makers, the media's effects can disappear or can be cancelled out by the contrasting motives 
of these two very different groups. 
Elections have specific time spans. Until election day, candidates place every effort 
to gather more supporters. As in a horse race, election results change with time. It is therefore 
disconcerting that only a few studies (e.g., Chaffee &Choe, 1980; Gopoian & 
Hadjiharalambous, 1994) have examined when voting decisions were made and how this 
influences the election process. 
Studies that examined time of decision have provided inconsistent findings about 
when people make up their minds about who to vote for. For example, Chaffee and Choe 
(1980) concluded that media effects were significant to those who make decisions during a 
campaign, but not to pre-campaign deciders or late deciders. This implies that the 
relationship between media use and time of decision is not linear, but quadratic. Gopoian and 
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Hadjiharalambous (1994), on the other hand, posit that there are no stable or consistent 
patterns of media use among late deciders in the 1972 to 1988 presidential campaigns. Their 
results imply that the relationship between media use and time of decision might be 
dependent on contextual factors. These conflicting results point to the need for more research 
in this area. 
Purpose of the study 
Why is time of decision an under-investigated variable in voting studies`? The first 
reason might be the use of contrasting theories to investigate media effects on voting 
behavior. For instance, Chaffee and Choe (1980) found that those who made a choice during 
a campaign used more media than pre-campaign deciders or late deciders because they had 
weak pre-existing attitudes and thus wanted to evaluate candidates with a more open mind. 
On the other hand, Gopoian and Hadjiharalambous (1994), who asserted that there were no 
persistent patterns of media exposure that will influence time of decision, were banking on a 
different theoretical framework altogether. Based on the uses and gratifications tradition 
(McLeod &Becker, 1974), media use differs according to people's intentions. while some 
attend to information that reinforces their beliefs and opinions, others scan information j ust 
for curiosity. In other words, voters who belong to the same late-decider group may use the 
media differently based on their level of interest. 
The second reason why time of decision is seldom the topic of scientific inquiry is 
the complications imposed by the persuasive aspect of political communication channels on 
the decision-making process. The few studies done on this regard assumed that media use 
was only related to voters' political knowledge acquisition, following limited and indirect 
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media effects. This could be justified if the dependent variable of interest was attitude or 
voting choices. However, knowledge acquisition is an insufficient condition for decision-
making. As studies on the diffusion of innovations (see Rogers, 2003) continuously show, the 
adoption of an innovation is a process with at least two stages: knowledge acquisition and 
persuasion. Persuasion's impact on decision-making, however, is seldom examined. Although 
recent election studies (e.g., Kim, Wyatt &Katz, 1999; Mutz &Martin, 2001; Putnam, 2000) 
have provided consistent evidence that interpersonal communication has more power to 
persuade people than the media, these results do not necessarily negate the media's ability to 
change people's minds (Abbot &Yarbrough, 1999). Thus, the relationship between time of 
decision and media use should be investigated wit~i this possibility in mind. 
The third reason for the dearth of time of decision studies is methodological 
constraints. Many political communication studies have looked at the influence of a host of 
independent variables on voting behavior or attitude toward candidates using multiple 
regression analysis. However, ordinary least square regression or logistic regression cannot 
properly handle the time factor. For practical reasons, scholars usually divide deciders into 
three or four groups (see Plumb, 1986). Because late deciders comprise only 17 to 33 percent 
of the total population and are frequently merged with non-voters (e.g., Gopoian & 
Hadj iharalambous, 1994), it is very difficult to detect statistically significant effects in often 
small sample sizes. Thus, Gopoian and Hadj iharalambous' (1994) conclusion that "late 
deciders are random in their character" (p. 76) can be interpreted to mean that "the small 
number of late-deciders make it difficult to determine their traits using regression methods." 
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The research plan 
To offset the weakness of previous studies that examined time of decision, this study 
treats time of decision as a continuous variable, not as a variable with discrete stages. 
Borrowing from Chaffee and Choe (1980) and Gopoian and Hadj iharalambous (1994), voters 
will be classified as (1)pre-campaign deciders, (2) campaign deciders, and (3) late deciders, 
but the impact of communication on time of decision will be done using longitudinal analytic 
techniques. 
If voters are deeply interested in the campaign process, exposure to mediated and 
interpersonal channels can be defined as active. If they are not interested, such exposure can 
be considered passive. Campaign interest is thus an important variable because it can 
influence media or interpersonal communication effects. Based on the classic minimal effects 
hypothesis (e.g., Klapper, 1960) and the uses and gratifications approach (e.g., McLeod & 
Becker, 1974), voters interested in a campaign are assumed to use the media to reinforce pre- 
existing attitudes. Uninterested voters, on the other hand, can be influenced by the mass 
media or personal contact due to the absence of or due to weak preferences. 
Because election campaigns are time-dependent political processes, this study uses a 
longitudinal event history analysis (or survival analysis) to test the relationship between 
communication and decision time. As election day approaches, the number of voters who 
decide on their preferred candidate increases while the number of undecided voters decreases. 
This pattern is very similar to that of the survival function of organisms which shows 
decreasing patterns due to death over time (Allison, 1984, and 1995). This means that a 
normal (or Gaussian) distribution with respect to the dependent variable cannot be assumed 
as in an OLS regression analysis. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS 
Overview of election studies 
A large body of research on political communication divides the predictors of voters' 
choice into two groups. The first group is composed of fixed or relatively stable variables 
identified in classic election studies the purpose of which is to answer the question, "Who 
chooses whom`?" These factors are social-demographic variables (Berelson, Lazarsfeld & 
McPhee, 1954; Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet, 1944) and voters' political-psychological 
variables such as party identification, candidate images or election issue positions (Campbell 
et al., 1960). Such factors were based on the results of studies done in the 1940s to the 1950s 
that showed these variables' strength in explaining and predicting the outcome of elections. 
The second group of predictors is composed of contingent factors such as political 
events (e.g., MacKuen, 1983) and evaluations of incumbent party or candidate performance 
(e.g., Kinder & Kiewiet, 1979; Stone, 1986). However, voters' evaluations of contingent 
factors are inevitably mediated by communication. In other words, political communication 
affects these contingent factors. 
Interpersonal communication has been known to affect voting behavior in early 
election studies (Katz &Lazarsfeld, 1955). Through interpersonal discussions, citizens share 
information and political opinions that lead to knowledge acquisition and the reinforcement 
or changing of attitudes (see Huckfeldt &Sprague, 1995; Kim, Wyatt &Katz, 1999). 
However, as people depend on the media more, the influence of interpersonal communication 
decreases. Traditional social structures and norms disintegrate due to social mobility, 
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metropolitan sprawl, the decline of civic engagement, and heavy Tv use (see Paxton, 1999; 
Putnam, 1995, 2000). Citizens learn election issues by, for example, watching televised 
debates and political ads (Best &Hubbard, 1999; Sears &Chaffee, 1979). As such, the 
media's role in political decision-making is expected to be heightened (see Ansolabehere & 
Iyengar, 1995; Putnam, 2000) as they cover more campaign and election-related issues. 
Time of decision 
There are, of course, different kinds of voters. Some of them are committed, are 
strongly partisan, and are highly opinionated. They use political information to strengthen 
their political preference, to clarify how candidates stand on issues, and to persuade others 
toward their points of view. Their opposite are the non-committed voters who are less 
politically-oriented or are less opinionated (Campbell et al., 1960), but whose voting 
decisions can still change (Chaffee &Choe, 1980). 
The proportion of late deciders in the whole population is stable across time. 
Previous studies have shown that they comprise about 30 percent of total voters. Because 
they can affect the final count, late deciders and the media's effects on their voting behaviors 
have been the subject of some scrutiny. Again, these studies have produced inconsistent and 
even contrasting results (see Campbell, et al., 1960; Chaffee &Choe, 1980; Gopoian & 
Hadj iharalambous, 1994; Plumb, 1986). These divergent results may have been due to the 
fact that non-committed voters can make decisions (1) during the convention, (2) after the 
nomination of candidates, and (3) at election day. The media, therefore, may have differing 
effects at each stage of the election process. 
Early studies (i.e., Berelson, Lazarsfeld &McPhee, 1954; Campbell, et al., 1960) 
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explain the voting decision of late deciders using the so-called "cross-pressure hypothesis." It 
posits that late deciders experience psychological conflict such as "approach-approach" (or 
avoidance-avoidance) conflict (Lewin, 193 5)1 that retards decisions. For example, a 
Republican could hesitate to vote for a Republican candidate if he/she takes apro-choice 
position toward the abortion issue. Feeling a discrepancy between party identification and the 
candidate's issue position, the time of decision is therefore prolonged following this 
hypothesis. Late deciders use communication channels to resolve the conflict. This implies 
that more media and interpersonal communication use can lead to more effects. 
In contrast to the cross-pressure hypothesis, Chaffee and Choe (1980) showed very 
provoking findings that the media can influence deciders during a convention or even two 
weeks before the actual election day. Late deciders were often found not to depend on the 
media and instead follow their political party leanings without much deliberation (Chaffee & 
Choe, 1980, p. 67). while Campbell et al. (1960) assumed that the relationship between time 
of decision and media use is linear, Chaffee and Choe (1980) argued that the relationship is 
qua ratic. 
Gopoian and Hadj iharalambous (1994) analyzed American National Election Studies 
CANES) data during presidential elections in the 1970s and 1980s and concluded that the 
media's effect was not consistent across time. In certain situations, media use was related to 
voting behavior but was not significantly influential in some elections. Summarizing these 
previous studies, three kinds of relationship between media use and time of decision can be 
deduced: linear, quadratic and random. Such relationships must be scrutinized because of 
' If voters are in a state ofavoidance-avoidance conflict, they will have no interest in politics and politicians. 
Even though studies dealing with the media's negative effects on people's trust on politics and politicians 
(Iyengar &Kinder, 1987; Putnam, 1993, 2000) did not use this term, the avoidance-avoidance conflict situation 
could lead to citizens' abandonment of their voting rights. 
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several weaknesses in the methodologies of studies that provided evidence for these 
relationships. 
First, these studies' theoretical focus was based on classifying decider groups by 
social-demographic and political-psychological variables. Chaffee and Choe (1980) used 
discriminant analysis while Gopoian and Hadj iharalambous (1994) conducted logistic 
regressions. While the former study chose the stepwise selection method, the latter tested all 
input variables. Thus, the former study could be a special case of the latter that did not show 
consistent significant effects according to the classification of late deciders. 
Second, these studies did not categorize decider groups based on political interest. 
Two studies (Chaffee &Choe, 1980; Gopoian &Hadj iharalambous, 1994) assumed that late 
deciders (including campaign deciders) were less interested with the elections and were 
politically alienated based on the findings of Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee (195 5), 
Campbell, et al. (1960), Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet (1943) and Seeman (1959). They 
did not consider that some late deciders can intentionally delay their decision time. Ignoring 
voters' level of interest is tricky since political philosopher David Braybrooke (1998) has 
conceptualized politically apathetic voters into two groups. One group is composed of those 
who "remain aloof from politics," and the other is made up of those who feel "excluded from 
politics" (p. 62). The first group intentionally delays voting choice for better j udgment, but 
the second does not find any incentive to participate in the political process at all. Therefore, 
while the political apathy of the aloof group could be active and function positively in a 
democracy, that of the alienated group could be passive and function negatively. Previous 
studies have lumped all late deciders into the latter group (those who feel excluded from 
politics), ignoring the possibility that they are just aloof from politics, asub-group that may 
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constitute a large proportion of late deciders. 
The current study offers new caveats compared to the previous ones. First, this study 
considers time as a variable having a critical role. Previous studies (Chaffee & Choe, 1980; 
Gopoian & Hadjiharalambous, 1994) treated time just as a criterion, for example, to analyze 
the behavior of last-minute deciders versus pre-campaign deciders and campaign deciders, or 
pre-campaign deciders versus campaign deciders and last minute deciders. However, 
decision-making happens across time. Determining when citizens decide on their candidate 
during the election process offers a better explanation of the antecedents of their decision 
than mere classification. Thus, this study uses a longitudinal analytic method to explain 
voting decision. 
Second, this study takes the individual's campaign interest into consideration, a 
factor which can regulate the effects of mediated or interpersonal communication. Based on 
Braybrooke's conceptualization (1998), this study divides late deciders into two groups: the 
"active delayers" who delay their decision for more deliberative judgment, and the "passive 
delayers" who subsequently decide despite having little or no political interest. It is posited 
that these two groups' use of mediated and interpersonal communication will differ and that 
those differences will have different political implications. While the active delayers might 
use political information disseminated by communication channels for their own decision-
making (see Klapper, 1960), passive delayers could be influenced by communication because 
they expose themselves to political information not filtered by their own particular interests. 
In other words, the decision-making logic of these two groups can be opposite of each other. 
Third, this study focuses on citizens' media use and interpersonal communication 
activity. Most studies usually highlight the virtue of interpersonal communication by 
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evaluating media influence negatively. For example, Putnam (1993, 1995, 2000) indicts the 
media, especially television, for the decline of American community and civic engagement. 
He argues that television steals citizens' social association and finally disconnects and 
isolates them from the political process. However, interpersonal communication does not 
always function in a positive way. Mutz and Martin (2001) found that voters who mainly 
depend on interpersonal communication have less chances of engaging different political 
opinions. People usually interact with others who share the same beliefs and opinions 
following the principle of homophily (Rogers, 2003; Shudson, 1997). In contrast, the mass 
media often provide air time and print space to heterogeneous opinions. According to Mutz 
and Martin (2001), the effect of interpersonal communication on the political process is 
usually that of reinforcement. On the other hand, media use neutralizes overly partisan 
political views and offers more possibilities for a broader and more enlightened political 
deliberation. 
Based on this reasoning, media use can perform different roles in determining time 
of decision. As early election studies showed, loyal partisans or opinion leaders comprise a 
special audience group that usually possesses high levels of political knowledge or high 
social economic status (e.g., Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet, 1944; Rogers, 2003). With 
strong conviction, they make voting choices. For voters who decide at the early stage, media 
use is positively related with faster decision-making based on the reinforcement hypothesis. 
On the other hand, according to Mutz and Martin (2001), more media use might delay 
decision-making. Thus, it is pertinent to ask: 
Research Question 1: During the early stage of an election campaign, what is the 
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influence of mediated and interpersonal communication on voters' decision-making? 
Based on early studies, late deciders can be divided into three groups: (1) those who 
delay their decision to solve psychological conflicts (e.g., Campbell, et al., 1960), (2) those 
who delay their decision to make better political judgments (Braybrooke, 1998; Kim, Wyatt 
& Katz, 1999), and (3) those who are alienated and have very little interest in politics 
(Berelson, Lazarsfeld &McPhee, 1947; Seeman, 1959). Regardless of the category late 
deciders belong to, they are more likely to make quicker decisions with exposure and 
attention to political communication channels. Of the three groups, however, those who delay 
making their decisions due to conflict or for more intense deliberations will be more 
influenced by communication. Of the two modes of communicating (mediated and 
interpersonal), mass media use will be more effective in bringing political information to 
their audiences. Therefore, as the elections draw to an end, especially for those with high 
political interest, high levels of media use could be related to quick decision-making. Thus, it 
is hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis la: During the late stage of an election campaign, voters more exposed to 
the mass media will decide earlier than those who were less exposed to them. 
Hypothesis lb: During the late stage of an election campaign, voters who engaged more 
in interpersonal communication will decide earlier than those who engaged less in 
interpersonal interaction. 
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What is, then, the relationship between communication and time of decision? The 
inconsistent results of previous studies do not offer definite predictions. According to Chaffee 
and Choe (1980), the relationship is non-linear (i.e., quadratic form). If the axioms of the 
cross-pressure hypothesis (Berelson, Lazarsfeld &McPhee, 1954; Campbell, et al., 1960) are 
to be heeded, those who decide closer to election day will do so with more communication 
channel use, especially that of the media. According to Gopoian and Hadj iharalambous 
(1994), there is no fixed relationship or there is but a very weak relationship between media 
use and time of decision. These competing explanations lead to two research questions: 
Research Question 2: What is the relationship between the combined effects of 
mediated and interpersonal communication and time of decision? 
Research Question 3: What is the separate pattern of effect for mediated and 
interpersonal communication on time of decision? 
Media influence versus personal influence 
Social scientists almost always assume the causal direction between concepts, but 
real causality is always under debate. Studies on media effects exhibit the difficulty of 
determining causality. Before the empirical studies of Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 
(1944), many worried about the possibility of being manipulated by the mass media. The 
mass media were believed to convert people's attitude toward politicians and/or political 
parties and consequently change the people's choice. The rise of Nazism in Germany and 
other forms of totalitarianism in many parts of the world triggered people's apprehensions 
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over the "hypodermic needle" effects of the mass media. 
Later empirical results discredited such powerful effects (Lazarsfeld, Berelson & 
Gaudet, 1944). People's voting choices or attitudes were then hypothesized to be influenced 
more by interpersonal interactions, according to Katz and Lazarsfeld (195 5 ). Such limited 
effects ushered in the main paradigm of media's effects in election campaigns, summarized 
as "the reinforcement ofpre-existing attitudes" (see Klapper, 1960). 
when the fulcrum of election studies moved from Columbia University to the 
University of Michigan, the notion of powerful media effects gained momentum once again. 
While the Columbia School tried to determine the relationship between social-demographic 
variables and people's political attitude or choice (e.g., Lazarsfeld, Berelson &Gaudet, 1944), 
the Michigan School considers the effects of three factors —party identification, issue 
orientation, and candidate image — on the same dependent variables (e.g., Campbell et al., 
1960). Their results showed that the media are not powerless, but have indirect effects on 
voters' choice. They can, for example, reinforce voters' party identification, help voters 
discriminate the candidates' positions on issues, or build positive or negative candidate 
images which function as heuristic political information (e.g., Best &Hubbard, 1999; Miller 
& Kronsick, 2000). 
Such media effects, however, were based on the unsupported assumption that voters 
usually seek political communication to satisfy their particular type of political interest. This 
assumption fails in the light of poll findings that more than one-third of citizens do not cast 
votes, and that some late deciders are alienated from the political process or feel frustrated by 
their perceived political inefficacy (Campbell et al., 1960; Seeman, 1959). In such cases, the 
reinforcing type of media effects cannot hold water because these citizens have no pre-
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existing attitudes to reinforce. The politically uninterested, therefore, need to be motivated to 
have an interest and to decide. In such cases, exposing them to political information will have 
no bearing on decision-making. 
Based on previous studies, two communication channels can be considered: 
mediated and interpersonal communication. Based on the diffusion theory (see Rogers, 2003), 
voters with little or no interest must be persuaded to be interested in an election through 
interpersonal channels. Thus, it can be hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis 2a: With more interpersonal contact, less interested voters will decide 
earlier than highly interested voters. 
According to the diffusion theory, the mass media are more effective than 
interpersonal communication channels in learning or acquiring information (e.g., Katz & 
Lazarsfeld, 1955; Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet, 1944; Rogers, 2003). Those who are 
interested are likely to expose themselves to the media to get more information. As 
information accumulal:es, voters will get stronger affirmation and feel more confident in 
making decisions. Thus, it is hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis 2b: With more mass media exposure, voters with high level of campaign 
interest will decide earlier than voters with less interest. 
18 
CHAPTER 3 
METI~ODOLOGY 
Unlike popular statistical methods such as OLS regression, logistic regression 
(Gopoian & Hadjiharalambous, 1994) or discriminant analysis (Chaffee & Choe, 1980) in 
election studies, this study uses event history analysis (Allison, 1984, and 1995) to examine 
data. The dependent variable, time of decision, is assumed not to be normally distributed. 
Instead, the distribution of voters' decision is expected to constantly drop with time (Figure 
1). This study deals with the secondary analysis of data gathered by the 2004 American 
National Election Studies (2004 ANES). 
Figure 1. Distribution of voters based on time of deicison during election campaigns 
(Source: ANES, 2004) 
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Survival analysis (i.e., event history analysis) is a statistical method used to study the 
occurrence and timing of events (Allison, 1984, and 1995). Originally, this method was 
developed in the area of biological statistics to study the death of living creatures over time 
by, for example, observing "time-to-death" of laboratory animals after medical treatments. 
Survival analysis can also be used to investigate different kinds of social events such as job 
terminations, divorce, or crime rates. If it is recognized that election campaigns are time-
dependent and that voters' decision-making resembles political events, survival analysis is an 
appropriate method of analyzing longitudinal political communication data and voting 
ehavlor. 
To understand the application of survival analysis on voting decision, it will be 
helpful to make an analogy.2 A 20 year-old person's probability of dying at this time can be 
assumed to stand at .02, the hazard for death. Because the hazard for death increases as a 
person ages (due to disease and potential accidents), the hazard rate is therefore not constant. 
This analogy can be applied to election situations. At the earliest stage of an election 
campaign, citizens who are politically flexible (i.e., those not yet their firm about their 
preference) can still be persuaded to change their minds. Their political flexibility is 
relatively higher at the early stage rather than at a later stage of the campaign. That is, the 
hazard to kill (or terminate) their political flexibility will be lower at the early stage. However, 
as election day approaches, this situation changes. Citizens are highly inclined to make their 
political decision if they want their voices heard in the democratic process. This means that 
their hazard for decision-making increases as the campaign progresses. 
2 Other statistical methods, such as multi-nominal or logistic regression, can be used to satisfy the purpose of 
this study. But because this study assumes longitudinal order of election stages, survival analysis can more 
properly handle this type of data. 
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A citizen's candidate choice can change during the political process. In survival 
analysis, this qualitative change rate (i.e., the change rate from undecided to decided across 
time) can be calculated and the relationship between individual characteristics and timing of 
events can be investigated. Survival analysis, specifically Cox regression, thus becomes a 
robust and reasonable option for two reasons. First, Cox regression does not require specific 
probability distributions (Allison, 1995, p. 112). Second, Cox regression is a useful tool to 
determine nonproportional hazard across time. This type of nonproportional hazard testing is 
suitable to detect the subtle effects of independent variables at different time points (p. 113). 
Data 
A limited range of variables from the 2004 ANES data seta was analyzed in this 
study. The sample consisted of 1,212 face-to-face interviews in the pre-election study, and 
1,066 interviews in the post-election study. The current study used only the post-election 
interview data because the dependent variable, time of decision, was investigated only in the 
post-election interviews. This study did not use a weight variable because the purpose does 
not demand exact prediction from a highly representative sample. Non-voters were excluded 
in the analysis.4 In the original data, all respondents who did not vote were treated as 
missing. Thus, of the 1,066 respondents, the responses of only 83 5 were used in the analysis. 
3 Data were downloaded from the website http://www.umicl~.edu/~nes/studypages;'download/datacenter.l~tm. 4 It is possible to treat non-voters as right-censored data. However, non-voters were dropped from the analysis 
because survival analysis assumes that the distribution of the analyzed sample and the censored sample are the 
same. However, decision-making after election day (i.e., t > 5) has no political relevance. 
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The dependent variable 
The dependent variable used in the analysis is the time for respondents to decide on 
their preferred presidential candidate. To measure this variable, the question "How long 
before the election did you decide that you were going to vote the way you did?" was used. 
The options respondents can choose from were "knew all along" (o), "when candidate 
announced" (1), "during conventions" (2), "post-convention period" (3), "last two weeks of 
the campaign" (4), and "on election day" (5). The decision-making status is mathematically 
presented as follows (Allison, 1984, p. 17): 
for t=0,1,2,3,4, and 5 where 
S(t) means decision-making status at time t, S(t)=o, if undecided; S(t)=1, if decided, 
xli denotes time-invarying factors; x2i(t) time-varying factors; c means constant. 
Because S(t) is dichotomous at each time t, the probability value must move from 0 
to 1. Thus, the decision-making status cannot be greater than one or less than zero. To 
overcome this problem, survival analysis adopts a logit transformation of S(t) as in the use of 
a link function in logistic regression. The above mathematical form was thus reformulated so 
that: 
log 
~ s(t) 
~ 1- s(t), = c +~3~r~it + ~Ztx2~ (t) 
Interpreting the mathematical representation, the left-hand side of the equation refers 
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to the change ratio of respondents from undecided to decided at time t. This study endows the 
value of 1 at each time if the respondent makes a decision at six points in this sequence. For 
example, voters who decided at the post-convention period were coded 1 after post-
convention, but they were given values of 0 before that time. 
Figure 1 shows that the proportion of deciders increases across time. Thus, on 
election day, the decision status of all respondents is 1. In the sample, 276 respondents said 
they "knew candidates all along" (0); 178 answered 1; 121 voters chose 2 and 3; 107 chose 4; 
and only 18 said they decided on election day (5). All variables used in this analysis are listed 
in Appendix B. 
Independent variables 
The main predictor variables used in this study are level of interest, mass media use, 
and inte~pe~sonal discussion. The variable level of interest was measured by asking 
respondents the question "Some people don't pay much attention to political campaigns. How 
about you? Would you say that you have been very much interested, somewhat interested or 
not much interested in the political campaigns so far this year?" The original choices were 
"very much interested" (1), "somewhat interested" (3), and "not much interested" (5). For 
this study, level of interest was recoded to "very much interested" (1) and "little or no 
interest" (0). A total of 496 respondents were categorized as "very much interested" and 325 
said they had "little or no interest" on the campaigns. 
The second variable, mass media use, was measured by the respondents' use of three 
kinds of media channels (television, radio and magazines) per week elicited through the 
following questions: "Would you say you watched a good many, several, or just one or two?" 
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"How much attention did you pay to magazine articles about the campaign for President — a 
great deal, quite a bit, some, very little, or none`?" and "Would you say you listened to a good 
many, several, or just one or two?" The original choices were "a great deal or a good many" 
(1), "quite a bit" (2), "some or several" (3 ), "very little" (4), and "none or j ust one or two" (5 ). 
However, this study recoded this variable so that a bigger number means more exposure to 
the mass medium. After recoding, the mean score was used as the measure of mass media use 
(Cronbach's a= .47, M=5.88, SD=3.72)5. 
The third variable, inte~pe~sonal discussion, was measured by asking respondents 
the question, "How many days in the past week did you talk about politics with family or 
friends?" The possible choices are the number of days per week people engaged in 
interpersonal discussion; that is, from 0 to 7 (M=3.00, SD=2.5 8). 
Control variables 
Based on previous election studies, this study used three blocks of control variables: 
(1)social-demographic variables, (2) political-psychological variables, and (3) other 
theoretically potential variables. 
Social-demographic variables. In this study, five social demographic variables were 
placed in the analysis. First, the gender of the respondents was coded "male" (1), and 
"female" (0). The number of male respondents was 3 83; the females were 43 8. Because 
Graber (1984) found that men were usually more interested in politics than women, gender is 
5 Cronbach's a is not a good reliability measure in this case because the purpose is to show the overall level of 
media use of each respondent, not to show a reduction of measurement error. 
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expected to influence voters' decisions. 
Second, race was coded "white" (0), and "non-white" (1). There were 626 
respondents who identified themselves as "white" and 195 were "non-whites." Based on 
studies of political alienation (e.g., Seeman, 1959), non-white respondents are usually 
alienated from the political process because they are not in the majority. As such, the 
influence of race needs to be controlled. 
Third, age was also included as a control variable. The age range of the sample was 
17 to 90, but this study recoded age into " 17-29" (1), "3 0-3 9" (2), "40-49" (3 ), "5 0-5 9" (4), 
"60-69" (5), and "70-90" (6). Based on previous research, older citizens make political 
decision more quickly than younger ones (Riggle &Johnson, 1996). In addition, older 
citizens show high loyalty to political parties (see Campbell, et al., 1960). Therefore, the 
impact of age must be controlled (M=3.39, SD=1.61). 
Fourth, level of income was recoded to "below $9,000" (1), "$9,000 to $22,000" (2), 
"$22,000 to $40,000" (3), "$40,000 to $80,000" (4), and "above $80,000" (5). Based on 
previous studies, opinion leaders are usually citizens with high social-economic status (see 
Lazarsfeld, Berelson &Gaudet, 1943) and have firm political opinions. Thus, the level of 
income can be related to voters' decisions. Therefore, this study controlled for the influence 
of level of income (M=2.94, SD=1.25). 
Finally, level of education was recoded to "below high school graduation" (1), "high 
school graduation" (2), "more than 12 years of education with no degree or college level" (3), 
"bachelor's degree" (4), and "above bachelor's degree" (5). Previous studies found that 
opinion leaders usually have high education (see Lazarsfeld, Berelson, &Gaudet, 1943) and 
their level of political sophistication is also high (Graber, 1984 and 2002). Thus, voters' 
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decisions can be influenced by education (M=3.12, SD=1.13). 
Political psychological variables. This study also included three popular political-
psychological variables—party identification, issue discrimination and image discrimination—
into the analysis. Early election studies found the important roles of these three variables on 
voting behavior (Campbell, et al., 1960). 
Party identification was measured by asking respondents, "Generally speaking, do 
you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?" The 
original choices were "strong Democrats" (0), "weak Democrat" (1), "Independent-
Democrat" (2), "Independent" (3), "Independent-Republican" (4), "weak Republican" (5), 
"strong Republican" (6), "other, minor party, or refuse to reply" (7), "apolitical" (8). Because 
this study does not investigate political orientation, the original values were recoded to 
represent degree of party loyalty. Thus, 0 and 6 were recoded into "strongly partisan" (4); 1 
and 5 were recoded into "weak partisan" (3 ); 2 and 4 were recoded into "very weak partisan" 
(2); 3 was recoded into "not partisan" (1). Sixty-one respondents reported no partisanship, 
218 showed very weak partisanship, 23 3 showed weak partisanship, and 3 23 showed strong 
partisanship (M=2.98, SD= .98). 
Issue discrimination was measured by calculating the perceived clistance between 
Kerry and Bush, the two presidential candidates during the campaign analyzed, on two 
election issues (abortion and intervention by diplomacy and military means). These were 
measured with aseven-point Likert type question and calculated by using the formula below 
(M=2.20, SD= .97). As the issue discrimination index becomes bigger, the respondents felt 
the two candidates were more different from each other on the two issues. 
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Formula 1 
IssueDisc~imination I= 2 j_I [(Perceived positionK~rr,~z ~~ — Perceived position~Z{.~~h~;,_;> 
)z 
[i (ith respondent) = 1,2,3,4, ....,83 5 and j (election issue) = 1, 2] 
Image discrimination was measured by taking the absolute value of the result 
obtained by subtracting the readings of two "feeling thermometers" for Kerry and Bush. 
Originally, the two feeling thermometers had 100 points. As Formula 2 shows, as this index 
becomes bigger, the difference of liking (or disliking) for the two candidates also increases 
(M=50.41, SD=27.77). 
Formula 2 
ImageDiscrimination_1 = FeelingThermometerKel.t.,, ~;~ - FeelingThermometerBtlsl,~;~ 
[i (ith respondent) = 1,2,3,4,....,835] 
Other theoretically potential variables. Four variables —political knowledge, 
governmental responsiveness, political trust, and indirect participation —were included as 
control variables. 
Political knowledge was measured by asking what job or political office do four 
domestic and international politicians now hold. The respondents received a point for each 
correctly identified politician. Thus, political knowledge ranged from 0 (all wrong answers) 
to 4 (all right answers). The mean score for political knowledge for the sample was 2.11 
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(SD=1.09). 
Governmental responsiveness refers to voters' felt confidence that their government 
responds to their political demands quickly (Almond &Verba, 1965; Putnam, 1993). If voters 
feel higher political responsiveness, they do not feel alienated. Political responsiveness was 
measured by asking two questions: "(1) Over the years, how much attention do you feel the 
government pays to what people think when it decides what to do — a good deal, some, or not 
much?" and "(2) How much do you feel that having elections makes the government pay 
attention to what the people think — a good deal, some, or not much?" Originally, the choices 
were coded as "a good deal" (1), "some" (3), and "not much" (5). However, this study 
recoded these variables to indicate higher political responsiveness with a bigger number 
(Cronbach's a=.55, M=2.24, SD=.51). 
Political trust was included as a control variable because citizens with low trust in 
politics do not participate and feel politically alienated (Almond &Verba, 1965; Putnam, 
1993, 2000). Political trust was measured by asking the following four questions: "(1) How 
much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is 
right —just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time?" "(2) Would you say 
the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it 
is run for the benefit of all the people?" "(3) Do you think that people in government waste a 
lot of the money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don't waste very much of it?" and "(4) 
Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are crooked, not very 
many are, or do you think hardly any of them are crooked?" The first question was reverse-
coded. Each question has three values, but this study recoded these values so that higher 
political trust means greater confidence in government (Cronbach's a=.59, M=1.62, SD=.46). 
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Indirect participation was also included as a control variable because voters who 
participated indirectly in campaigns were more likely to make their political decisions earlier. 
Indirect participation was measured by asking respondents if they participated in six 
campaign activities: (1) attempted to influence others, (2) participated in campaign meetings, 
rallies and speeches, (3) displayed campaign buttons, stickers or signs, (4) did campaign 
work for a party or candidate, (5) contributed to a candidate's campaign, and (6) gave money 
to a political party. Thus, indirect participation values ranged from 0 to 6. The sample mean 
score for indirect participation was 1.17 (SD=1.24). 
The research model 
In the analysis, the control variables were inputted first. These were then followed by 
(1) the five social-demographic variables, (2) the three political-psychology variables, and 
(3) the four related political variables. Then, the two variables measuring political 
communication channels, (1) mass media use and (2) interpersonal discussion, were 
incorporated. In addition, level of interest was used to categorize voters into those with high 
interest and those with little or no interest. The model used in this study is diagrammed in 
Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. The study's research model 
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The event of interest in this study is the respondents' decision-making time after the 
start of the election campaign. The purpose is to find out the impact of campaign interest and 
use of mediated communication and interpersonal communication after controlling for the 
effects of the other control variables in the research model illustrated above. 
With the exception of social-demographic variables (gender, race, age, income, and 
education), all variables are not strongly stable across the election campaign period. For 
example, the level of issue or image discrimination could change as shown by previous 
election studies (e.g., Deli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Marcus, 2003). This study did not treat 
the control variables as time-varying factors. Many classic studies (e.g., Campbell, et al., 
1960; Nie, verba & Petrocik, 1976) continuously showed that political psychology variables 
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are relatively stable across time. In addition, other control variables, such as political 
knowledge (Deli Carpini & Keeter, 1996), governmental responsiveness (Almond & Verba, 
1965), political trust (Putman, 1995), and indirect participation (Putman, 2000) are also 
known to be stable as societal attributes. Thus this study treated the control variables as time-
fixed factors throughout the campaign period. 
However, the effects of the two modes of communication (mass media use and 
interpersonal communication) were allowed to vary at different stages of the campaign. 
Based on these assumptions, this study constructed three models to investigate the research 
questions and hypotheses. The base model (Model 1) was constructed with 15 independent 
variables — 12 control variables and three independent variables. This model assumes that the 
effect of each independent variable is the same at all points during the campaign. 
The next model (Mode12), however, examined the non-proportional hazard ratio 
across time. Following the convention of previous studies' classification, this model tested 
the existence of nonproportional hazard for two modes of communication. The effects of the 
two communication modes on time of decision were examined by constructing two-way 
interaction terms as time-dependent covariates (i.e., whether the respondent decided about 
his/her preferred candidate during the campaign period versus the early period, and late 
period versus early period). This model was tested and compared to the results achieved 
using Model 1. 
Finally, three-way interaction terms in Model 3 were constructed by using 
communication channels, time-dependent covariates and campaign interest. The model 
improvement index was also tested against Model 2. Using Model 3, this study tried to end 
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out the regulatory effect of campaign interest on the relationship between time of decision 
and mode of communication. Figure 3 illustrates the relationship among these seven models. 
Figure 3. The three models of analysis tested and their relationships to each other 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
Descriptive analysis: Who decides early and who decides late? 
Before the analysis, this study investigated the characteristics of each decider group 
following the conventional classification: (1) the early deciders (n=178, 32.66%), (2) 
campaign deciders (n=242, 44.40%), and (3) late deciders (n=125, 29.94%). Descriptive 
statistics based on 15 independent variables among the three groups were determined and the 
differences among the three groups based on these 15 variables were tested. 
Of the 15 independent variables, three were categorical variables (gender, race, and 
campaign interest) and 12 were continuous variables (age, income, education, partisan 
strength, issue discrimination, image discrimination, political knowledge, indirect 
participation, mass media exposure and interpersonal discussion). For the categorical 
variables, the difference among the three groups was tested using 
x 
statistics. Analysis of 
variance tests were employed to find out the difference among them in terms of the 
continuous variables. The results are summarized in Table 1. 
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The results echo the findings of previous studies that investigated time of decision 
(Chaffee & Choe, 1980; Gopoian & Hadjiharalambous, 1994). There can hardly be found 
any difference among the three groups in social-demographic background, except in race 
Lx2ta~2>=5.30, p < .10]. Those who identified themselves as white fall under the early decider 
group. The non-white group chose their preferred presidential candidate later than the whites. 
However, this is not a strong pattern considering the relatively low p-value calculated from a 
sample size of 545. 
The three groups, however, differed significantly in terms ofpolitical-psychological 
variables. Early deciders showed stronger partisanship [F(2,542)=10.48, p < .001], felt that 
the two candidates' position on issues were more distant from each other [F(2,493)=7.68, p 
< .001], and distinguished each candidate image more clearly [F(2,540)=60.80, p < .001]. 
This finding is also consistent with those of previous election studies. 
In terms of the other theoretically potential variables, the three groups were not 
significantly different from each other except regarding the degree of indirect political 
participation [F(2, 542)=13.37, p < .001]. This is a reasonable outcome considering that 
indirect participation is possible only after a preference has been made. 
The groups, however, significantly differed in terms of the three main independent 
variables. Highly interested voters decided more quickly [x2~d~2~=19.23, p < .001] and the 
proportion of disinterested late deciders (31.43%) jumped about 1.5 times that of interested 
voters (16.00%). Voters who decided earlier devoted more time to communication (mediated 
and interpersonal). However, while the difference in mass media exposure were statistically 
significant at the .Ol level [F(2,493)=5.32], the level of interpersonal discussion was not 
significant even at the traditional .OS level [F(2,493)=2.33]. Considering that the degree of 
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freedom is exactly the same, it is notable that the differences in mass media exposure among 
the three groups are more manifest than the differences in interpersonal interaction. 
Time of decision model assuming proportional hazard: Testing Model 1 
First, this study tested the effects of the two communication modes and campaign 
interest on decision-making assuming that proportional hazard is the same across each time 
point. The results in Table 2 show that four independent variables—race (white, ~3= -.119, 
x ~ 1 ~=2.73 2, p < .10), image discrimination (~3g=. 014, x ~ 1 ~=46.5 5 5, p < .001), political trust 
(~ l 0=.227, ~ ~ 1 ~=3.827, p < .OS), and campaign interest 0313=.264, x ~ 1 ~=5.226, p < .OS)—lead to 
a faster change in decision status across time, with the other variables being constant. 
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Voters with high levels of campaign interest decided on a preferred candidate about 
3 0 percent faster (hazard ratio= l .3 02) than those with low interest. However, the two 
coefficients for mode of communication were not significantly related to decision-making. 
That is, there is no evidence to suggest that decision status is related to exposure to mediated 
or interpersonal communication. However, Model 1, the base model, assumed the same 
proportional hazard across the whole period. To identify nonproportional hazard for the two 
communication modes, the respondents were divided into four groups based on two criteria—
exposure to mediated and interpersonal communication and campaign interest. Then the 
decision hazard for each of the four groups was displayed. The four-way classification of 
respondents is depicted in Figure 5. 
Figure 5. Classification of voters based on mediated and interpersonal communication 
exposure and campaign interest 
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As Figure 5 shows, mediated/interpersonal communication and campaign interest 
were correlated with each other. The Pearson's r in the first classification (MG) was .424 
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which was significant at the .001 level. The correlation coefficient was also significant in the 
second classification (r=.364, p < .001). Because voters with high interest tend to seek more 
information, this result is expected. 
Based on the first classification (MG), the hazard change patterns for decision- 
making is shown in Figure 6. 
Figure 6. The hazard patterns of voters in MG 
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Figure 6 demonstrates three things. First, that the assumption of proportional hazard 
in Model 1 is not defensible. As Figure 6 shows, the hazard becomes stronger as the election 
draws to an end. Second, heavy users of mass media decided earlier than light users (MG 1 
and MG2 > MG3 and MG4). Third, campaign interest regulates the effect of mass media 
exposure. Among heavy mass media users (MG 1 and MG2), highly interested voters 
definitely decided earlier than voters with low campaign interest after the start of the national 
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convention. However, among light users (MG3 and MG4), the pattern is different. During the 
national convention period (t=2 and 3), less interested voters decided earlier than the highly 
interested voters. However, the pattern was reversed during the last two weeks before 
election day. 
The hazard patterns for decision-making among voters in the second group (PG) 
were ascertained. The results are shown in Figure 7. 
Figure 7. The hazard patterns of voters in PG 
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The hazard patterns in Figure 7looks very similar to those in Figure 6. Also in this 
case, the assumption of proportional hazard in Model 1 cannot be defended. Those who 
exposed themselves more to interpersonal communication decided earlier than the less 
interpersonally active voters (PG1 and PG2 > PG3 and PG4). However, the regulatory effect 
of campaign interest was quite different from the patterns exhibited by voters in MG. Among 
highly interactive voters (PG1 and PG2), those with high levels of campaign interest chose 
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their preferred candidate earlier than those who were less interested after the national 
convention. Among the less interpersonally active voters (PG3 and PG4), the pattern is 
different. During the national convention period (t=2 and 3), highly interested voters decided 
earlier than the less interested voters. However, the pattern was reversed during the last two 
weeks of the election period. 
Among the two groups classified in both MG and PG, the regulatory effect of 
campaign interest changes among light users of both communication modes two weeks 
before the elections. During the national convention, while campaign interest increased the 
positive impact of interpersonal communication, it attenuated the effect of mass media 
exposure. During the last period, campaign interest stimulated mass media effect, but 
weakened that of interpersonal communication. 
Based on these, it can be surmised that: (1) the effects of mediated and interpersonal 
communication are nonproportional and vary across time. (2) Greater exposure to mediated 
and interpersonal communication leads to earlier decision-making, (3) and campaign interest 
plays a pivotal role in anticipating the impact of mediated and interpersonal communication. 
As such, further analyses to test the statistical significance related to the research questions 
and the hypotheses were conducted. 
Testing the nonproportional hazard model using interaction terms: Testing Model 2 and Mode13 
As Figure 6 and Figure 7 showed, the hazard related to mediated and interpersonal 
communication becomes bigger as the elections draw to a close. Further tests were needed to 
determine: (1) the effects of mediated and interpersonal communication during the national 
convention period and two weeks prior to election day; and (2) to find statistically significant 
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evidence that campaign interest regulates the effects of mediated and interpersonal 
communication. The results of such testing are summarized in Table 3. 
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The results outlined in Table 3 support the nonporportional hazard shown in the 
previous two figures. Here, the effects of mass media exposure and interpersonal 
communication are evident [R 14=.169, x (awl)=3 7.967, p < .001, hazard ratio=1.184; R 15=.115, 
x, (awl)=5.729, p < .001, hazard ratio=1.122] after isolating the influence of the campaign 
period (t=2 and 3) and the late campaign period (t=4 and 5). The four two-way interaction 
terms in Model 2 are all statistically significant [316=.159, x (awl )=26.426, p < .001, hazard 
ratio=1.172; ~3 l ~=.111, x (awl)=4.199, p < .001, hazard ratio=1.118; [i l s=.3 82, ~ (awl >=100. S 60, 
p < .001, hazard ratio=1.465; R 19=.260, x (awl)=17.019, p < .001, hazard ratio=1.296] . The 
resulting model improvement value was also statistically significant [~ (a~4)=355.280, p 
< .001 ] . This means that the two effects of communication modes are not the same across 
time. These effects grew with time. 
Based on the results for Model 2, the hazard for the decision rate affected by 
mediated and interpersonal communication increased exponentially. In the case of mass 
media exposure, aone-unit increase in mass media use improves the likelihood of decision 
change about 20 percent earlier during the early stage, jumps to about 3 3 percent during the 
campaign period, and goes up to 74 percent at the late period. Likewise, aone-unit increase 
in interpersonal discussion increases the likelihood of decision change about 12 percent 
earlier during the early stage, about 23 percent earlier during the national convention, and 
about 46 percent during the late period.6
6 The parameter estimate and hazard ratio during campaign period can be calculated as follows: 
Effect of mass media exposure during campaign period, 
Parameter estimate: .169 0314) + .159 (R16)= .325 
Hazard ratio: exponential value of .325 equals 1.3 84 
Effect of interpersonal during campaign period, 
Parameter estimate: .115 (R15) + .l 11 0317)= .226 
Hazard ratio: exponential value of .325 equals 1.254 
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The results for Mode13 show the regulatory effect of campaign interest at each time 
period. Among the four coefficients, only one is significant [(314=-•189, ~~a~~~=4.484, p < .10, 
hazard ratio= .828]. This can be interpreted to mean that during the last two weeks, less 
interested voters decided about 30 percent earlier than highly interested voters with a one- 
unit increase in interpersonal communication. However, no evidence was found to suggest 
that campaign interest regulated the effect of mass media exposure or interpersonal 
communication in the other three stages. Here, the model improvement value was also 
statistically significant [x ~d~~~=10.770, p < .OS]. 
Based on the results for Mode12 and Model 3, three arguments related to Research 
Questions 1 and 2 and Hypotheses 1 and 2 can be made: (1) The effect of mediated and 
interpersonal communication gets stronger as the election ends, (2) the influence of mass 
media exposure was much larger than that of interpersonal discussion at all time points, and 
(3) campaign interest plays a particularly critical role in regulating the effect of interpersonal 
discussion two weeks before election day. 
Effect of mass media exposure during last two weeks prior to election day, 
Parameter estimate: .169 (~i 14) + .3 82 0318)= .5 51 
Hazard ratio: exponential value of .325 equals 1.735 
Effect of interpersonal communication during last two weeks prior to election day„ 
Parameter estimate: .l 15 (~15) + .260 0319)= .375 
Hazard ratio: exponential value of .325 equals 1.455 
The parameter estimate and hazard ratio during last two weeks can be calculated as follows: 
Effect of interpersonal communication during campaign period among highly interested voters, 
Parameter estimate: .120 (R15) + .159 (~19) — .l 89 0322)= .302 
Hazard ratio: exponential value of .302 equals 1.353 
Effect of interpersonal communication during campaign period among less interested voters, 
Parameter estimate: .120 (R15) + .159 0319) _ .491 
Hazard ratio: exponential value of .491 equals 1.634 
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Time of decision and use of two communication modes: Results related to RQ3 
In order to display the changing patterns of proportional hazard as influenced by 
mediated and/or interpersonal communication, the respondents were divided into four groups 
based on their mean score for mass media exposure (M=5.54) and interpersonal discussion 
(M=2.86). These four groups were: (1) those with high levels of mass media exposure and 
interpersonal discussion (Group 1, n=161); (2) those with high levels of mass media exposure 
but with low levels of interpersonal discussion (Group 2, n=111); (3) those with low levels of 
mass media exposure but with high levels of interpersonal discussion (Group 3, n=97); and 
(4) those with low levels of mass media exposure and interpersonal discussion (Group 4, 
n=176). As the classification of four groups indicated, two variables are correlated with each 
other (~=.370, p < .001). Figure 8 displays the changing patterns of the hazard ratio for 
voters' decisions across the four groups. 
Figure 8. Changing pattern of hazard for decision rate among four groups of 
respondents based on level of mediated and interpersonal communication. 
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As Figure 8 indicates, the groups with low levels of interpersonal discussion (Group 
2 and Group 4) did not show a wide difference in decision change during the election, but 
Group 1 and Group 3 demonstrated different trends. Under Group 1 (i.e., bold line) are voters 
who actively use both communication modes. They decided faster than those in other groups 
at all points in time. Group 3 shows a pattern that is in sharp contrast with all other groups, 
especially during the last two weeks (t=4 and 5) of the campaign process. Group 3's pattern 
implies that the effect of interpersonal discussion is regulated by mass media exposure. 
Those patterns, together with the coefficients shown in Model 2 and Model 3, support the 
reinforcement effect of the mass media and the persuasive influence of interpersonal 
communication as suggested by classic election studies and the diffusion of innovations 
tradition. 
Therefore, the influence of mass media exposure can be gleaned more during the 
earlier stage of the election campaign (the reinforcement hypothesis), while the impact of 
interpersonal communication can be discerned only at a later stage (the persuasive effect of 
interpersonal interaction). 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary of findings 
Through event history analysis, this study found evidence to support the contention 
that several factors play crucial roles in voters' decision-making during elections. First, this 
study found that time of decision is related to the level of mediated and/or interpersonal 
communication voters engage in throughout the campaign process. Specifically, the findings 
suggest that the effect of communication is not the same at all stages of the campaign. The 
influence of mediated and interpersonal communication on time of decision strengthens as 
the election draws to a close. Second, the findings support the hypotheses that the mass 
media reinforce existing attitudes while interpersonal communication has a greater power to 
affect voting choices at the point when actual behavioral outcomes are needed. That is, the 
effect of interpersonal communication shows up at the latter period of the election, especially 
among voters with little campaign interest (i.e., those with weak pre-existing attitudes). Third, 
the mass media consistently showed a lager magnitude of effect than interpersonal 
communication at every stage of the process. 
Implications of the findings 
This study's results offer several theoretical and practical implications regarding the 
role of communication in the election process. First, this study applied the diffusion of 
innovations approach (see, Rogers, 2003) to determine time of decision during elections, a 
largely ignored domain of application. To date, majority of the studies under this tradition 
has been confined to examining the locus and breadth of the diffusion of technological 
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innovations, specific ideas and practices. On the other hand, election studies are usually done 
with the view toward understanding the role of political and psychological variables (e.g., 
Campbell et al., 1960) in shaping voting patterns and behavior. In the field of political 
communication, studies have focused on knowledge acquisition or affective/emotional 
evaluations as influenced by media use. While these studies have produced useful results, 
they have ignored the fact that elections are inherently time-bound processes. 
Indeed, this study found that the effect of mediated and interpersonal communication 
is different at each stage of this process. The findings suggest that the diffusion of 
innovations theory can be a useful theoretical framework with which to examine the role of 
communication in hastening or retarding voters' decision-making in an election period. 
Second, the results of this study suggest that the effect of communication— mediated 
or interpersonal—is regulated or moderated by time. The results for Model 1 (R 14=.013, 
x ~1~=.030; R15=-.001, x  ~1~=.242 in Table 2) bear this out. Many previous election studies 
using cross-sectional data have frequently assumed that the effect of time is constant or 
homogeneous during the whole election cycle. In other words, a lot of studies do not 
distinguish between early deciders and late deciders. Only a few assumed the contrary (e.g., 
Best &Hubbard, 1999; Chaffee &Choe, 1980; Gopoian & Hadj iharalambous, 1994). 
The result of this study that tested nonproportional hazards across time using 
interaction terms support stronger communication effects, especially during the later part of 
the election. The finding that the effect of communication is not proportional all the time is 
consistent with those of other studies (Best &Hubbard, 1999; Chaffee &Choe, 1980). 
Best and Hubbard (1999), however, suggested that mass media use is more important 
in the early periods of the campaign because information about candidates are relatively 
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ambiguous at these early stages. On the other hand, Chaffee and Choe (1980) asserted that 
those who decided after the national convention until about two weeks prior to election day 
are more influenced by the mass media. This study did not find strong evidence to support a 
stronger media effect at the early period. It has weaker evidence for media effect after the 
convention. However, it found that media effect grows in strength as the campaign 
progresses into its last stages. 
This inconsistency across studies can be due to the differences in the dependent 
variable examined. While Best and Hubbard (1999) used voters' knowledge and evaluations 
of a candidate as the dependent variable, this study adopted status of decision as the 
dependent measure. Although decision-making is the final outcome of the process, 
knowledge acquisition and information evaluation are considered as preconditions for 
decision-making. 
Chaffee and Choe (1980) also used decision status as their dependent variable. 
However, while they included non-voters in the sample, this study excluded the non-voters. 
Considering the small number of late-deciders, the different results can be due to the 
inclusion or exclusion of non-voters in each study. Thus, future studies can benefit from 
similar dependent measures and consistent sample characteristics. 
Third, this study offers campaign strategists useful guidelines in the deployment of 
communication tactics. The findings of this study suggest that mediated as well as 
interpersonal communication can be used strategically, especially when two candidates are 
too close to each other at the polls. The big magnitude of media effect two weeks before 
election day 0318=.3 82, x ~ 1 ~=100.5 60, p < .001 in Mode12, Table 3) implies that the 
candidate who releases more political ads or performs better in televised debates can seize 
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the moment to position himself/herself as a winner. Considering the prohibitive cost of these 
promotional efforts, knowing when political ads should be released can maximize 
promotional material production and efficiency. 
Fourth, how the two communication modes are used has important implications to a 
representative democracy. While the effect of interpersonal discussion differs among voters 
with and without campaign interest (~22=-.189, x  ~1~=4.484, p < .10 in Model 3 of Table 3), 
the effect of mass media does not (~ 1 s=.074, x ~ 1 ~=1.3 67, n. s. in Model 3 of Table 3 ). That is, 
interpersonal discussion seems to produce a selective impact—only among voters with less 
interest—but media exposure drives voting decisions faster regardless of campaign interest. 
That is, the mass media can influence both active and passive delayers in Braybrooke's 
categorization (1998). 
Considering that voters with little or no campaign interest have relatively low 
political knowledge or less defined political opinions (Campbell et al., 1960; Chaffee & Choe, 
1980; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996), this type of media effect can be dangerous to a healthy 
democracy. Even though this study did not divide neutral political news from partisan 
political ads, advertisements often overpower political news in terms of frequency. Thus, a 
candidate who can occupy media time has a greater likelihood of winning the race regardless 
of expertise and leadership quality. This can lead to the pessimistic prediction that 
representative democracy will eventually succumb to the degrading impacts of its own 
practices (Schumpeter, 1950). 
Limitations of the study 
This section acknowledges the study's several limitations. 
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First, although event history analysis normally uses panel data, this study analyzed 
retrospective and secondary data. The dependent variable was measured using respondents' 
recollection of events after an election. Because the reliability of recall measures is always in 
doubt (Plumb, 1986), the findings should be interpreted with extreme care. 
Second, this study assumed that decision-making is an irreversible process. That is, 
decisions once made cannot be revoked. Although this rarely happens, voters have been 
known to change their minds in cases of a candidate's death or in the face of a big scandal 
(see Comstock & Scharrer, 2005, p. 208). 
Third, this study considered factors that vary with time—for example, political 
knowledge, candidate image, issue discrimination—as time-fixed factors. Modes of 
communicating usually change these factors, but this study assumed a weak relationship 
between communication and time-varying factors due to the limitations of the sample data. In 
this study, the effect of mediated and interpersonal communication was interpreted to 
become bigger at later stages of the campaign. However, this interpretation did not consider 
the effects oftime-varying factors. 
Fourth, this study did not take into consideration the content of mass media or 
interpersonal discussion, let alone the quality of such content. 
Fifth, this study did not take into account the effect of history or particular political 
events on time of decision. Sudden outbreaks, such as changing conditions overseas or a 
scandal, can influence the popularity of a presidential candidate. 
Finally, the effect of the modes of communication on decision-making in the 2004 
presidential elections in particular could be different in elections aimed at selecting 
congressional representatives or senators. Because presidential election issues are felt or 
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experienced indirectly, mass media exposure was assumed to be more strongly related to 
political decision-making than interpersonal interaction. In localized elections, election issues 
and candidates are evaluated more directly. Thus, the effects of interpersonal communication 
and mass media use can change according to type of election. 
Suggestions for future studies 
To arrive at more robust interpretations and generalizations, this method of inquiry 
can be applied to other presidential elections data. Gopoian and Hadj iharambous (1994) 
found that late deciders show inconsistent voting patterns in the elections conducted in the 
1980s and 1990s. Thus, other national presidential elections should be investigated using the 
same research design. Also, as mentioned above, different kinds of elections can be subjected 
to the same line of inquiry (i.e., congressional, senate, gubernatorial). 
Second, elections of varying geographical scope (i.e., national versus local) can also 
be investigated using the same analytic model applied in this study. In national elections, 
mass media can be very influential because voters have scarce experience about presidential 
candidates. However, local elections can be more influenced by the local mass media or 
interpersonal deliberations because voters have an easier access to the candidates and are 
often more knowledgeable about local issues. 
Finally, a panel design to cover the entire election period is needed to investigate the 
relationship between time of decision and communication. Using panel data, the problem of 
reliability and validity of recall data can be solved, time-varying factors can be tested, any 
change in candidate preference can be investigated, and the impact of political events on the 
popularity of a candidate can be measured. In contrast to recall data achieved through a one-
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time cross-sectional survey, panel design findings can provide more concrete and robust 
results. 
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APPENDIX A. THE SURVEY QUESTIONAIRE 
Time of decision: 
How long before the election did you decide that you were going to vote the way you 
did? 
Race of respondents: 
What racial or ethnic group or groups best describes you? 
Education of respondents: 
What is the highest grade of school or year of college you have completed? 
Income level of respondents: 
[Now we are interested in the income that you yourself received in 2003, not 
including any of the income received by (your spouse and) the rest of your family. Please 
look at this page and tell me the income you yourself had in 2003 before taxes. Please tell me 
the letter of the income group that includes the income you had in 2003 before taxes.] 
This figure should include salaries, wages, pensions, dividends, interest, and all other income. 
Party identification of respondents: 
Do you think of yourself as CLOSER to the Republican party or to the Democratic 
pa y? 
Abortion issue position: 
Where would you place GEORGE W. BUSH? (on abortion)? 
Where would you place JOHN KERRY? (on abortion)? 
Interventionism by diplomacy/military: 
Where would you place GEORGE W. BUSH (on this scale)? 
Where would you place JOHN KERRY (on this scale)? 
Feeling thermometer: 
(How would you rate:) GEORGE W. BUSH? 
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(How would you rate:) JOHN KERRY? 
Political knowledge: 
The first name is Dennis Hastert. What job or political office does he NOW hold? 
Dick Cheney. What job or political office does he NOW hold? 
Tony Blair. What j ob or political office does he NOW hold? 
William Rehnquist. What job or political office does he NOW hold? 
Political trust: 
How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to 
do what is right —JUST ABOUT ALWAYS, MOST OF THE TIME, or ONLY SOME OF 
THE TIME? 
Would you say the government is pretty much RLTN BY A FEW BIG INTERESTS 
looking out for themselves or that it is run for the BENEFIT OF ALL THE PEOPLE? 
Do you think that people in government WASTE A LOT of the money we pay in 
taxes, WASTE SOME of it, or DON'T WASTE VERY MUCH of it? 
Do you think that QUITE A FEW of the people running the government are crooked, 
NOT VERY MANY are, or do you think HARDLY ANY of them are crooked? 
Governmental responsiveness: 
Over the years, how much attention do you feel the government pays to what people 
think when it decides what to do -- a GOOD DEAL, SOME, or NOT MUCH? 
How much do you feel that having elections makes the government pay attention to 
what the people think -- a GOOD DEAL, SOME, or NOT MUCH? 
Indirect participation: 
During the campaign, did you talk to any people and try to show them why they 
should vote for or against one of the parties or candidates? 
Did you go to any political meetings, rallies, speeches, dinners, or things like that in 
support of a particular candidate? 
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Did you wear a campaign button, put a campaign sticker on your car, or place a sign 
in your window or in front of your house? 
Did you do any (other) work for one of the parties or candidates? 
During an election year people are often asked to make a contribution to support 
campaigns. Did you give money to an INDIVIDUAL CANDIDATE running for public 
office? 
Did you give money to a POLITICAL PARTY during this election year? (V045015) 
Campaign interest: 
Some people don't pay much attention to political campaigns. How about you? 
Would you say that you have been VERY MUCH interested, SOMEWHAT interested or 
NOT MUCH interested in the political campaigns so far this year? 
Interpersonal discussion: 
How many days in the past week did you talk about politics with family or friends? 
Mass media exposure: 
Did you watch any programs about the campaign on television? 
Would you say you watched A GOOD MANY, SEVERAL, or JUST ONE OR TWO? 
Did you read about the campaign in any magazines? 
How much attention did you pay to magazine articles about the campaign for 
President -- A GREAT DEAL, QUITE A BIT, SOME, VERY LITTLE, or NONE? 
Did you listen to any speeches or discussions about the campaign on the radio? 
Would you say you listened to A GOOD MANY, SEVERAL, or JUST ONE OR 
TWO? 
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APPENDIX B. VARIABLES IN THE 2004 AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTION 
STUDIES DATA 
Time of decision: VCF0712 
Gender of respondents: V041109a 
Age of respondents: V043250 
Race of respondents: V043299 
Education of respondents: V043254 
Income level of respondents: V043294 
Party identification of respondents: V043116 
Abortion issue position: V045134 (G. W. Bush) / V045135 (J. Kerry) 
Interventionism by diplomacy/military: V045126 (G. W. Bush) / V045127 (J. Kerry) 
Feeling thermometer: V045043 (G W. Bush) / V045044 (J. Kerry) 
Political knowledge: V045162, V045163, V045164, and V045165 
Political trust: V045197, V045198, V045199, and V045200 
Governmental responsiveness: V045203, and VO4~204 
Indirect participation: V045010, V045011, V045012, V045013, V045014, and 
V045015 
Campaign interest: V045001 
Interpersonal discussion: V045153a 
Mass media exposure: Television (V045002/V045002a), 
Magazine (V045004/V045004a), and Radio (V045005/V045005a) 
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APPENDIX C. CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN 
THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
~- 
M 
M .--~ 
u 
Cpl 
u 
.^'~ 
O 
n 
40 
r 
N u 
r-+ N oa a 
c~ 
►n 
~ C3! 
N 'd' 
O. 
t~ •--+ `~' C"-. 
Q '-+ 
•--i ..-i 
M ►t7 
N 
C 
d t;J :F 
~--i p 
~`i f V 
~. ~ 
O C~ 
N *-~ 
O 04 
~' N 
t^1 CJ 
~G 00 
N 
0o en 
c+~, ^-+ 
.-~ o0 
N 
~. 
o 
ca 
t~ c>. 
~ ~~ 
~ o 
ca 
~• 
O ~ 
O 
.-~ p U.
35
7'~
*~
 
U
.3
6b
""
~ 
a~• 
~ ~ ~ 
~ 3F ~ 
~ M ~ C>d 
O O 00 
Q M cV M 
~--~ O ~ ~ 
X•. 
~F X ~. .~ 
O ~ ~ G1 ~0 
N. N lam- '~' 
C O •--~ ~•-•i D 
~--~ ~ cam. O 
aE• 
k +. ~. 
O N N 00 ,--~ JO 
~ ~ O. 
a v v. .~ ~ 
~ ~ 
~• ~• :E 
k -x ac 
O ,--~ v'~ M v? ~f-
~-! Q~ [' l M lD 
G ~"'7. ~--~ N N M c 
+-' ~ O O C O 
~ ~ 
~ ~ ~ 
G'`~ ~^.. ::c dF fit• *-+ cY1 00 
D ~ Q p C~ N ~ r
•-~ G' ~i Ci 4 O O 
aF ae ~:- 
O a1 O ~ ('rf O~ 'd' tr r+ 
I`~ 41 p i/q ul OQ t~ N 
G~ +-i N Q O ~ ~ .--~ 
*-~ ~ C7 ~ ~ O Q O 
U:
 24
~'~
 *'~
 
U.
17
2'~
 * ~
: 
dF 
-x •x• x• ac 
~ ~ ~ ,~ ~- ~ 
C C c'M 
•- ~ ; ~ ~7 O ~ d O ~ d 
-f-
C O~ 
C OG 
C C 
,-~ C 0.
19
 
O 
a:• ~ '~ 
~' oC ~ t~l O ~ .C•r; ~ 9G O *-~. 
~f. C ~ ~ 
.-•~ C  C ~ d 
~• + 
o a ~n c o -~ c oc 
o ~ o 
r-+ ~ o 
;~ 
~. 
N ~" ~" o o  ra 
O ,•_; v co 0 
~• ~• 
CO ~" CM Vr cM .-~ oc o 
Q ~J Q N .^., 
~-+ O ~ C~ G 
~. 
,~-, 
N u 
+n 
co 0 
00 
M 
C7 
•~ ar ~• 
01 C{', t~ f`I 
M CV .O~ G'~ 
Q ±-~ S~ O 
Q ~ O O 
Yl 41 M ,-1 
Cf 00 *—s M 
O d rJ O 
0 o co a 
~ ~ 
~~ 
G` 
0 0 
cv 
M 
0 
aE• Ji• '~- 
O C~ 
-U
.14
7~
"~
 ~ 
U.
14
'7'
~'~
 
U.
17
4~
'~*
 
0.
25
*~
x 
0 
M 
00 
~D 
O 
O 
'~' 
M 
CO 
d-
C7 
0 
M 
~7 
CO 
~ ~ ~ ~ 
t~ O ~ „-, ~ x ~• a „_,NQ~o~.o.~ o ~ '~ o ~ ~ ,~ ~; o
~e ~i G7 ~ ~^. C7 O CU O 
.-, ,-. ,-. r-. ,,. ,-, ,-. ,-. ,~ 
~ :,.i 
~ ~ 
O c3. ~ ~ 
• ~ ~ A 
U ~ W 
i',., . ~ ~ 
;~ r :~ 
p" OD 
r. vi 
►~ U ~ 
N M '~' 
~ U ...~ 
